{"id":834,"date":"2009-12-14T10:43:48","date_gmt":"2009-12-14T10:43:48","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/scientopia.org\/blogs\/goodmath\/2009\/12\/14\/id-garbage-csi-as-non-computability\/"},"modified":"2009-12-14T10:43:48","modified_gmt":"2009-12-14T10:43:48","slug":"id-garbage-csi-as-non-computability","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.goodmath.org\/blog\/2009\/12\/14\/id-garbage-csi-as-non-computability\/","title":{"rendered":"ID Garbage: CSI as Non-Computability"},"content":{"rendered":"

An alert reader pointed me at a recent post over at Uncommon Descent<\/a> by a guy who calls
\nhimself “niwrad”, which argues (among other things) that life is
\nnon-computable. In fact, it basically tries to use computability
\nas the basis of Yet Another Sloppy ID Argument (TM).<\/p>\n

As you might expect, it’s garbage. But it’s garbage that’s right
\nup my alley!<\/p>\n

It’s not an easy post to summarize, because frankly, it’s
\npretty incoherent. As you’ll see when we starting looking
\nat the sections, niwrad contradicts himself freely, without seeming
\nto even notice it, much less realize that it’s actually a problem
\nwhen your argument is self-contradictory!<\/p>\n

To make sense out of it, the easiest thing to do is to put it into the
\ncontext of the basic ID arguments. Bill Dembski created a concept called
\n“specified complexity” or “complex specified information”. I’ll get to the
\ndefinition of that in a moment; but the point of CSI is that according to
\nIDists, only an intelligent agent can create CSI. If a mechanical process
\nappears to create CSI, that’s because the CSI was actually created by an
\nintelligent agent, and embedded in the mechanical process. What our new friend
\nniwrad does is create a variant of that: instead of just saying “nothing but
\nan intelligent agent can create CSI”, he says “CSI is uncomputable, therefore
\nnothing but an intelligent agent can create it” – that it, he’s just injecting
\ncomputability into the argument in a totally arbitrary way. <\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

So, what’s CSI? Long-time readers will have seen my old
\ncritique of it<\/a>. I’ll just reiterate the key points here. CSI is something
\nthat you can never really pin down: it’s a contradiction wrapped up in
\nobfuscatory mathematics to make it appear meaningful. Nothing<\/em>
\nactually has specified complexity, because nothing can<\/em> have specified
\ncomplexity, because specified complexity is fundamentally self-contradictory:
\nby looking at the basic definitions of the terms using information theory, you
\nfind that specification equals not-complex, and complex equals not-specified.
\nSo to have specified complexity is something like being both invisible and
\nflorescent pink at the same time.<\/p>\n

Ok, background out of the way. Let’s look at his article. In the first
\nsection, he presents his version the standard CSI argument, with the random
\ninsertion of computability. I think the best summary of it is the following:<\/p>\n

\n

IDT shows that CSI cannot be generated by chance and necessity
\n(randomness and laws). An algorithm (which is a generalization of law) can
\noutput only what is computable and CSI is not. The concept of intelligence as
\n“generator of CSI” can be generalized as “generator of what is incomputable”.
\nObviously, needless to say, intelligence eventually can generate also what is
\ncomputable (in fact what can do more can do less). Intelligence can work as a
\nmachine but a machine cannot work as intelligence. Between the two there is a
\nnon invertible relation. This is the reason why intelligence designs machines
\nand the inverse is impossible. To consider intelligence as “generator of what
\nis incomputable” makes sense because we know that intelligence is able for
\ninstance to develop math. Metamathematics (G\u00f6del theorems) states that math is
\nin general incomputable. It establishes limits to the mechanistic deducibility
\nbut doesn’t establish limits to the intelligence and creativity of
\nmathematicians.<\/p>\n

Now it’s straightforward to see that the generator of what is incomputable
\nis incomputable. Let’s hypothesize that it is computable, i.e. can be
\ngenerated by a TM. If this TM can generate it and in turn it can generate what
\nis incomputable then, given that an output of an output is an output, this TM
\ncould compute what is incomputable and this is a contradiction. Since we get a
\ncontradiction the premise is untrue, then intelligence is not computable.\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Before I get to the meat of it… Gödel’s theorems don’t say that
\n“Math in general is uncomputable”. I’m going to pick on this, because
\nI’ve mentioned Gödel many times on this blog, and I’ve frequently
\nbeen guilty of over-simplifying when I talk about what Gödel’s incompleteness
\ntheorem actually says. It’s hard to state simply in a way that actually gets
\nthe true depth and meaning of it across clearly. But as bad as I’ve been,
\nI’ve never come close to botching Gödel this badly. I don’t know
\nwhether niwrad has ever actually studied Gödel or not; I suspect
\nnot, and that this is just his wretched misstatement of his own misunderstanding
\nof an over-simplified statement of Gödel by someone like me. But it
\ndoes point out the danger of having people like me try to present
\nsimplified explanations of complicated things: there are always bozos
\nwho believe that by hearing a simplified intuitive explanation of something,
\nthat they’ve understood the whole thing, and will then go off and run
\nwith it.<\/p>\n

(What Gödel actually said is something closer to “Any sufficiently
\npowerful formal reasoning system will be either incomplete or inconsistent. If
\nit’s incomplete, that means that it will be capable of expressing true
\nstatements which are not provable in the system. If it’s inconsistent, it will
\nbe capable of expressing statements which are neither true nor<\/em>
\nfalse.” And that is, itself, a wretched over-simplification, and I’m willing
\nto bet that a couple of commenters will call me on it. Trying to state
\nGödel simply is really difficult, because it’s simultaneously
\na simple statement mathematically, while also being incredibly deep
\nand profound. It just doesn’t render well into english.)<\/p>\n

But that’s not close to the worst part this babble. That’s
\nthe second paragraph quoted above: “The generator of what is incomputable
\nis incomputable”.<\/p>\n

The fundamental example, the first example, the most canonical example of
\nun-computability that anyone who studies computation knows about is called
\nthe halting problem<\/em>. The whole point<\/em> of the halting problem
\nis that you can easily create a program<\/em> which generates non-computable
\nresults! The proof of the halting problem shows a completely mechanical
\ncomputable mechanism by which any supposed halting oracle can be
\ndefeated – thus showing that the halting problem is uncomputable.<\/p>\n

That’s also part of what Gödel did. He showed a mechanical<\/em>
\nprocess by which you can trick any sufficiently powerful formal system into
\nproducing problematical statements. You don’t even need to understand the
\nsystem. I can write a program<\/em> which takes a description of a formal
\nsystem as input, and generates the series of steps to produce a Gödel
\nstatement for that system. So the claim that Gödel proved that
\nyou can’t generate uncomputable things by a computable mechanism is
\ncomplete nonsense – in fact, it’s the opposite<\/em> of what Gödel
\nproved.<\/p>\n

But you can basically take this section, and reduce it to a simple circle:
\nIntelligence is the ability to generate CSI. Why can intelligent things
\ngenerate CSI? Because the definition of intelligence is the ability to
\ngenerate CSI, therefore if something is intelligent, it can generate CSI.
\nReally, computability is just a red-herring: he’s equated CSI with
\na particular kind of non-computability, and then written the CSI circular
\nargument with “CSI” replaced with “CSI equivalent noncomputability”.<\/p>\n

In the next section, he tries to go a bit farther, and not just prove that
\nintelligence is non-computable, but that the non-computability of intelligence
\nproves that there must be a God, which is the “infinite information
\nsource.”. In this section, he proceeds to disprove<\/em> his argument
\nfrom the previous section.<\/p>\n

The argument: Intelligent beings produce information. Information can’t
\ncome from nowhere. Where did it come from? In the last section, he said that
\nintelligent beings can create CSI. But now he’s actually reneging on that. The
\ninformation that intelligent beings produce can’t just come from the
\nintelligent beings: that would be creating something from nothing, which is
\nimpossible. So there must be a higher being – an infinite information
\nsource<\/em> which produced all of the information. Intelligent beings
\ndon’t<\/em> create information. They just regurgitate it. <\/p>\n

He doesn’t seem to have the slightest clue that he’s contradicting himself
\nhere. But by the argument in this section, a human being is no different from
\na Turing machine: both cannot, by his argument, produce CSI\/CSI-equivalent
\nnoncomputable information, unless they’ve obtained it from some other source.
\nSuddenly, life isn’t “non-computable” anymore – what he describes now is life
\nas a computable device which takes inputs from the “infinite information
\nsource”. (Which is, of course, just another shallow renaming: just as he
\nsubstitutes “CSI-equivalent noncomputability” for “CSI”, he substitutes
\n“infinite information source” for “intelligent designer”). It’s the
\nsame stupid trick.<\/p>\n

After lots of rambling around that basic argument, he moves on to his next
\nsection, in which he proceeds to pretend that he didn’t just obliterate his
\nown argument. He returns back to the argument that since supposedly intelligent
\nbeings can create information, they must be non-materialistic – because
\nmaterialistic things can’t do non-computable stuff.<\/p>\n

The whole computability argument comes down to this little bit of
\ncircularity. niwrad asserts<\/em> that life in general, and intelligence in
\nparticular, must contain CSI. But he can’t prove it. He can’t point at
\nany specific property and prove that it has CSI. Instead he just relies on
\nintuition: it’s just obvious<\/em> that these things have specified
\ncomplexity. <\/p>\n

Then he asserts that CSI can’t be generated by any non-intelligent
\nprocess. Again, he doesn’t prove it; he doesn’t even really argue<\/em>
\nit. He just blindly asserts<\/em> it. <\/p>\n

Finally, he takes his two assertions: life has CSI; CSI can’t be produced
\nby a non-intelligent process, and based on those, he can conclude that life is
\nnon-computable. Since a computing device isn’t intelligent, it can’t produce
\nCSI: CSI is, by definition, non-computable. Therefore, if life (or intelligent
\nlife) contains CSI, then by definition, life is non-computable. QED.<\/p>\n

Same old, same old.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

An alert reader pointed me at a recent post over at Uncommon Descent by a guy who calls himself “niwrad”, which argues (among other things) that life is non-computable. In fact, it basically tries to use computability as the basis of Yet Another Sloppy ID Argument (TM). As you might expect, it’s garbage. But it’s […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[16,31],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-834","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-debunking-creationism","category-intelligent-design"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p4lzZS-ds","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.goodmath.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/834","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.goodmath.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.goodmath.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.goodmath.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.goodmath.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=834"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/www.goodmath.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/834\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.goodmath.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=834"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.goodmath.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=834"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.goodmath.org\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=834"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}