I’m going to be on vacation this week, which means that I won’t have time to write new posts. But my friend Dr. SkySkull was just talking about Gödel on twitter, and chatting with him, I realized that this would be a good time to repost some stuff that I wrote about Gödel’s incompleteness proof.

Incompleteness is one of the most beautiful and profound proofs that I’ve ever seen. If you’re at all interested in mathematics, it’s something that’s worth taking the effort to understand. But it’s also pretty on-topic for what I’ve been writing about. The original incompleteness proof is written for a dialect of math based on ST type theory!

It takes a fair bit of effort to work through the incompleteness proof, so it’ll be a weeks worth of reposts. What I’m going to do is work with this translation of the original paper where Gödel published his first incompleteness proof. Before we can get to the actual proof, we need to learn a bit about the particular kind of logic that he used in his proof.

It goes right back to the roots of type theory. Set theory was on the rocks, due to Russell’s paradox. Russell’s paradox did was show that there was a foundational problem in math. You could develop what appeared to be a valid mathematicial structure and theory, only to later discover that all the work you did was garbage, because there was some non-obvious fundamental inconsistency in how you defined it. But the way that foundations were treated simple wasn’t strong or formal enough to be able to detect, right up front, whether you’d hard-wired an inconsistency into your theory. So foundations had to change, to prevent another incident like the disaster of early set theory.

In the middle of this, along came two mathematicians, Russell and Whitehead, who wanted to solve the problem once and for all. They created an amazing piece of work called the Principia Mathematica. The principia was supposed to be an ideal, perfect mathematical foundation. It was designed to have to key properties: it was supposed to consistent, and it was supposed to be complete.

- Consistent meant that the statement would not allow any inconsistencies of any kind. If you used the logic and the foundantions of the Principia, you couldn’t even
*say*anything like Russell’s paradox: you couldn’t even write it as a valid statement. - Complete meant that every true statement was provably true, every false statement was provably false, and
*every*statement was either true or false.

A big part of how it did this was by creating a very strict stratification of logic – the stratification that we discussed in ST type theory. The principia’s type-theoretic logic could reason about a specific number, using level-0 statements. You could reason about sets of numbers using level-1 statements. And you could reason about sets of sets of numbers using level-2 statements. In a level-1 statement, you could make meta-statements about level-0 properties, but you couldn’t reason about level-1. In level-2, you could reason about level-1 and level-0, but not about level-2. This meant that you couldn’t make a set like the set of all sets that don’t contain themselves – because that set is formed using a predicate – and when you’re forming a set like “the set of all sets that don’t contain themselves”, the sets you can reason about are a level below you. You can form a level-1 set using a level-1 statement about level-0 objects. But you can’t make a level-1 statement about level-1 objects! So self-referential systems would be completely impossible in the Principia’s logic. You just can’t even state Russell’s paradox. It’s inexpressible.

As a modern student of math, it’s hard to understand what a profound thing they were trying to do. We’ve grown up learning math long after incompleteness became a well-known fact of life. (I read “Gödel Escher Bach” when I was a college freshman – well before I took any particularly deep math classes – so I knew about incompleteness before I knew enough to really understand what completeness woud have meant!) The principia would have been the perfection of math, a final ultimate perfect system. There would have been *nothing* that we couldn’t prove, nothing in math that we couldn’t know!

What Gödel did was show that using the Principia’s own system, and it’s own syntax, that not only was the principia itself flawed, but that *any possible effort* like the principia would inevitably be flawed!

With the incompleteness proof, Gödel showed that even in the Principia, even with all of the effort that it made to strictly separate the levels of reasoning, that he could form self-referential statements, and that those self-referential statements were both true and unprovable.

The way that he did it was simply brilliant. The proof was a sequence of steps.

- He showed that using Peano arithmetic – that is, the basic definition of natural numbers and natural number arithmetic – that you could take any principia-logic statement, and uniquely encode it as a number – so that every logical statement was a number, and ever number was a specific logical statement.
- Then using that basic mechanic, he showed how you could take any property defined by a predicate in the principia’s logic, and encode it as a arithmetic property of the numbers. So a number encoded a statement, and the property of a number could be encoded arithmetically. A number, then, could be both a statement, and a definition of an arithmetic property of a stament, and a logical description of a logical property of a statement – all at once!
- Using that encoding, then – which can be formed for
*any*logic that can express Peano arithmetic – he showed that you could form a self-referential statement: a number that was a statement about numbers including the number that was statement itself. And more, it could encode a meta-property of the statement in a way that was both true, and also unprovable: he showed how to create a logical property “There is no proof of this statement”, which applied to its own numeric encoding. So the statement said, about itself, that it couldn’t be proven.

The existence of that statement meant that the Principia – and any similar system! – was incomplete. Completeness means that every true statement is provably true within the system. But the statement encodes the fact that it cannot be proven. If you could prove it, the system would be inconsistent. If you can’t, it’s consistent, but incomplete.

We’re going to go through all of that in detail.

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