I’m trying to get back to writing about type theory. Since it’s been quite a while since the last type theory post, we’ll start with a bit of review.

What is this type theory stuff about?

The basic motivation behind type theory is that set theory isn’t the best foundation for mathematics. It seems great at first, but when you dig in deep, you start to see cracks.

If you start with naive set theory, the initial view is amazing: it’s so simple! But it falls apart: it’s not consistent. When you patch it, creating axiomatic set theory, you get something that isn’t logically inconsistent – but it’s a whole lot more complicated. And while it does fix the inconsistency, it still gives you some results which seem wrong.

Type theory covers a range of approaches that try to construct a foundational theory of mathematics that has the intuitive appeal of axiomatic set theory, but without some of its problems.

The particular form of type theory that we’ve been looking at is called Martin-Löf type theory. M-L type theory is a *constructive* theory of mathematics in which computation plays a central role. The theory rebuilds mathematics in a very concrete form: every proof must explicitly *construct* the objects it talks about. Every existence proof doesn’t just prove that something exists in the abstract – it provides a set of instructions (a program!) to construct an example of the thing that exists. Every proof that something is false provides a set of instructions (also a program!) for how to construct a counterexample that demonstrates its falsehood.

This is, necessarily, a weaker foundation for math than traditional axiomatic set theory. There are useful things that are provable in axiomatic set theory, but which aren’t provable in a mathematics based on M-L type theory. That’s the price you pay for the constructive foundations. But in exchange, you get something that is, in many ways, clearer and more reasonable than axiomatic set theory. Like so many things, it’s a tradeoff.

The constructivist nature of M-L type theory is particularly interesting to wierdos like me, because it means that programming becomes the foundation of mathematics. It creates a beautiful cyclic relationship: mathematics is the foundation of programming, and programming is the foundation of mathematics. The two are, in essence, one and the same thing.

The traditional set theoretic basis of mathematics uses set theory with first order predicate logic. FOPL and set theory are so tightly entangled in the structure of mathematics that they’re almost inseparable. The basic definitions of type theory require logical predicates that look pretty much like FOPL; and FOPL requires a model that looks pretty much like set theory.

For our type theory, we can’t use FOPL – it’s part of the problem. Instead, Martin-Lof used intuitionistic logic. Intuitionistic logic plays the same role in type theory that FOPL plays in set theory: it’s deeply entwined into the entire system of types.

The most basic thing to understand in type theory is what a logical proposition means. A proposition is a complete logical statement no unbound variables and no quantifiers. For example, “Mark has blue eyes” is a proposition. A simple proposition is a statement of fact about a specific object. In type theory, a proof of a proposition is a program that demonstrates that the statement is true. A proof that “Mark has blue eyes” is a program that does something like “Look at a picture of Mark, screen out everything but the eyes, measure the color C of his eyes, and then check that C is within the range of frequencies that we call “blue”. We can only say that a proposition is true if we can write that program.

Simple propositions are important as a starting point, but you can’t do anything terribly interesting with them. Reasoning with simple propositions is like writing a program where you can only use literal values, but no variables. To be able to do interesting things, you really need variables.

In Martin-Lof type theory, variables come along with *predicates*. A predicate is a statement describing a property or fact about an object (or about a collection of objects) – but instead of defining it in terms of a single fixed value like a proposition, it takes a parameter. “Mark has blue eyes” is a proposition; “Has blue eyes” is a predicate. In M-L type theory, a predicate is only meaningful if you can write a program that, given an object (or group of objects) as a parameter, can determine whether or no the predicate is true for that object.

That’s roughly where we got to in type theory before the blog went on hiatus.

did i misread this last line of the 12th paragraph? should it say:

‘[NOT]interesting until you can work with variables.’

Welcome back 🙂

my two thoughts after reading your introduction:

how does one represent x + 0 = x without an axiom?

what happens when x/0?

re: “The basic definitions of type theory require logical predicates that look pretty much like FOPL;” did you mean set theory here?

Minor typo: “can determine whether or no the predicate is true for that object” should be “can determine whether or not the predicate is true for that object” (“no” -> “not”).